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CRIMINALIZING HACKING, NOT DATING:
RECONSTRUCTING THE CFAA INTENT
REQUIREMENT
DAVID THAW*
Cybercrime is a growing problem in the United States and worldwide.
Many questions remain unanswered as to the proper role and scope of
criminal law in addressing socially undesirable actions affecting and
conducted through the use of computers and modern information
technologies. This Article tackles perhaps the most exigent question in U.S.
cybercrime law—the scope of activities that should be subject to criminal
sanction under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the federal
antihacking statute. At the core of current CFAA debate is the question of
whether private contracts, such as website terms of use or organizational
acceptable use policies should be able to define the limits of authorization
and access for purposes of criminal sanctions under the CFAA. Many
scholars and activists argue that such contracts should not, because they
may result in ridiculous consequences such as the criminalization of
misrepresenting one’s desirability on an online dating website. Critics of
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law and
Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project.
This work benefited from the thoughtful commentary of Jack Balkin, Derek
Bambauer, Rebecca Bolin, Bryan Choi, Mathilde Cohen, Anjali Dalal, William Eyre, James
Grimmelmann, Kaaryn Gustafson, Dalié Jiménez, Camilla Hrdy, Margot Kaminski, Orin
Kerr, James Kwak, Andrea Matwyshyn, George Mocsary, Christina Mulligan, Paul Ohm,
Lisa Ouellette, Mark Paulding, Randy Sabett, Julia Simon-Kerr, and the participants in the
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology’s February 2013 Symposium on Cybercrime. A
draft of this work will be presented at the 2013 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and the
author extends anticipatory thanks to the participants for what is expected to be thoughtful
and insightful commentary on this work and for inspiring future related work. The research
staff of the University of Connecticut Law Library provided invaluable research assistance
with this work, specifically including Craigin Howland. Finally, the author would like to
extend his deepest gratitude to the editors and staff of the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, including Jonathan Jacobson, Lily Katz, Megan Lawson, Jessica Notebaert,
Robert (Max) Tanner, Daniel Truesdell, and Hannah Wendling, for their tremendous
assistance and patience with the expansion of a planned short Essay into a full Article
responsive to current events shortly before the Symposium.

907

908

DAVID THAW

[Vol. 103

such arguments rebut that failing to allow contract-based restrictions opens
the door for hackers to engage in many types of disfavored activity not
otherwise subject to criminal sanction. This Article examines the tension
between these two positions, both from the standpoint of current U.S.
jurisprudence and scholarship, and from the standpoint of the respective
purposes of criminal and tort law in deterring and punishing socially
undesirable behavior. The Article concludes by proposing a legislative
revision to the CFAA’s mens rea element that substantially mitigates the
risk of overbroad criminalization while leaving intact the ability of the law
to deter and punish the most serious acts affecting and utilizing computers.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses a growing problem with existing United States
federal law addressing cybercrime. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986 (CFAA), which in part revised earlier (limited) legislation on the
subject, is the primary federal antihacking statute providing both criminal
penalties and (limited) rights of private action for certain unauthorized
activities using computers and similar information systems. Congress
originally intended to address only a narrow range of crimes1 but, as others
have observed,2 the statute’s scope expanded dramatically over the past two
decades.
The result of this expansion threatens to criminalize wide varieties of
activities, common to the ordinary computer and Internet user, that are
apparently innocuous in the context of “hacking,” but technically constitute
unauthorized activities or activities exceeding a user’s authorized access. It
is now common, if not near-universal, practice for popular Internet websites
to have terms-of-service agreements3 and for employers and other operators
of computer systems to have acceptable-use policies.4 Such policies
frequently contain provisions governing what activities are and are not
acceptable on the website or computer system. Over the course of the past
several years, prosecutors and private parties increasingly have asserted
these terms to define the boundaries of authorized access on computer
systems; thus, violations of those terms constitute unauthorized access in
violation of the CFAA.
While existing scholarship on the subject is still limited, the balance
seems to favor an approach under which private agreements cannot define
the boundaries of criminal activity.5 The federal courts of appeal have split
1

See infra Part I.A for further discussion of congressional intent.
See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010).
3 Terms-of-service agreements generally are contracts of adhesion that lay out the ways
in which a website operator allows users to access, interact with, and otherwise make use of
the website and its associated systems. Such agreements almost always include restrictions
on behaviors, if any, that the website operator considers inappropriate.
4 Employers and other network operators (e.g., colleges and universities, Internet service
providers, public libraries) nearly universally require users to agree, whether at the time of
access (for transactional users like patrons of a public library) or at the time of setup (for
relationship users like resident students at universities), to various conditions for use of the
network. These conditions are specified in what is most commonly known as an acceptableuse policy. It functions similarly to the terms-of-service agreements referenced supra in note
3, but generally focuses more on the ways in which individuals use the network (i.e., what
data is sent to/from computers and other devices they connect to the network) rather than on
the ways in which users interact with a specific program or application (e.g., a website).
5 See Kerr, supra note 2; see also Andrea Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5–8) (on file with the Journal of
2
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on the issue, with the Fifth6 and Seventh7 Circuits permitting such
agreements to define authorized access for criminal purposes and the
Fourth8 and Ninth Circuits9 rejecting such an approach. To date, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue or granted certiorari in any case
decided by the courts of appeal.
This Article responds to the debate in existing scholarship and the
problems presented by the circuit split in an interconnected world.10 It
specifically takes up Professor Orin Kerr’s invitation11 seeking debate on
the subject of access- or authorization-based tests in electronic crimes and
challenges the solution proposed by Professor Kerr and the courts. The
Article also responds to recent events12 and resultant attention in Congress
to possible reform of the CFAA. It identifies the shortcomings and risks in
these current proposals, and suggests an alternate method of addressing
overbreadth and vagueness problems in the existing statute through
legislative reform of the mens rea element of the statute.
I propose legislative reconstruction of the existing mens rea element
for at least § 1030(a)(2) of the CFAA13 and perhaps all portions of
18 U.S.C. § 1030, where private agreements (e.g., terms of service) may
define the boundaries of authorized access to computing and information
systems. Specifically, I suggest a two-part intent requirement: (1) that the
actor intentionally engage in an action not only constituting unauthorized
access,14 but also that the intent be that the action result in unauthorized

Criminal Law and Criminology).
6
United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010).
7 Int’l Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2006).
8 WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012).
9 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
10 The electronically interconnected nature of the Information Age allows prosecutors
and parties the ability to forum shop for a favorable circuit in a way perhaps not previously
conceived of. Not only are potential actors held accountable in those areas where they know
they establish minimum contacts (e.g., where they mail an item in a mail fraud scheme), but
also where they may not know (or the average person may not even be able to know) they
established contacts (e.g., the location of various Internet services to which they directly and
secondarily connect).
11 Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1643–44 (2003).
12 See, e.g., Matt Pearce, Swartz’s Dad Lashes Out at Prosecutors, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2013, at AA2.
13 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2006). The other sections may require intent reform as well.
However, the additional damages elements of those provisions often serve as sufficient
protection against overbroad prosecution. Nonetheless, there are advantages to a uniform
mens rea element for all portions of the statute where private agreements may govern the
scope of authorized access.
14 This is the effect of the current language, which some courts have described as nearly
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access, an express element requiring proof that the actor reasonably should
have known that the action in question was unauthorized under a terms-ofservice or similar agreement;15 and (2) that this action be in furtherance
either of one of a list of specifically prohibited computer-specific crimes16
or alternatively in furtherance of an act otherwise unlawful under existing
state or federal law.
The goal of this proposed reform is to better align the effect and reach
of the statute with congressional intent regarding acts deserving of criminal
punishment, while at the same time maintaining its ability to serve as an
effective deterrent to (and mechanism of punishment for) acts uniquely
involving computers and modern information technologies that I argue
should be criminalized. In Part II.B of this Article, I present a typology
describing the types of acts with which the federal criminal law should be
concerned. Based on that typology, I evaluate the degree to which legal
alternatives may serve as substitutes in deterring and/or punishing
perpetrators of such actions. I conclude that the most obvious alternative,
private tort law, is vastly insufficient either as a deterrent or a mechanism of
punishment, suggesting the importance of engaging the criminal law.
Reform of the mens rea element also suggests a larger question in the
context of electronic crimes—how to conceive of “intent” in virtual worlds

tautological and providing trivial differentiation. See, e.g., Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856–58.
15 In other words, the provision prohibiting the action at issue must not have been buried
in difficult-to-understand language in the middle of a 10,000-word agreement. There exists
substantial literature and ongoing work on effective user-notice mechanisms upon which
Congress may draw in crafting such a notice requirement. See, e.g., Aleecia M. McDonald
et al., A Comparative Study of Online Privacy Policies and Formats, in PRIVACY ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES 37, 37–55 (Ian Goldberg & Mikhail J. Atallah eds., 2009); CTR. FOR INFO.
POLICY LEADERSHIP, TEN STEPS TO DEVELOP A MULTILAYERED PRIVACY NOTICE (2007),
available at http://www.informationpolicycentre.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Centre/
Ten_Steps_whitepaper.pdf; Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Future of Privacy Policies: A Privacy
Nutrition Label Filled with Fair Information Practices, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 1 (2009).
16 For example, a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack in itself is unlikely to be
criminal as pertains to the victim website but for its effect on the target machine, an effect
that is difficult to describe as criminal within the ambit of physical-world-oriented criminal
statutes or other electronic crimes statutes. See United States v. Raisley, 466 F. App’x 125,
126–27 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Raisley . . . used [an] infected network of computers to launch
‘Distributed Denial of Service’ [] attacks against websites . . . . A DDOS attack uses
multiple computers simultaneously to request information from a website. If done on a large
enough scale, the requests overwhelm the website, take the victim server off line, and render
the site inaccessible.”). The district court convicted Raisley for these activities under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Note, however, that it is possible that the use of individual
machines taking part in the attack on the target website may constitute individual acts
violating the CFAA or other statutes, but such use (assuming it was, in fact, unauthorized) is
far more difficult to track than is the effect on the target website itself.
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where the physical-world actions taken to bring about virtual-world results
may have different (and sometimes disjunctive) intent associated with them.
The Article opens this discussion, in part, by analogizing my proposed
CFAA mens rea reform to distinctions in the intent requirements of
physical-world crimes. It is a first step in this regard, and one I hope opens
an ongoing discussion regarding the question of intent with respect to
actions that have both physical-world and virtual-world consequences.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a contextual
history of the CFAA relevant to the question of prosecution for agreementbased authorization violations of the CFAA and the role of the mens rea
element in protecting against overbroad prosecutions.
It provides
background on congressional intent, examines the types of bad actors and
the types of harms against which Congress sought to protect, and proposes a
stratification of the cybercrime ecosystem as a way to categorize the types
of criminal activity at issue. It then proceeds to provide a background on
select cases highlighting the challenges inherent in the CFAA’s existing
authorized-access approach and intent requirement. Part II explores the
concept of defining the boundaries of criminal action as a function of
private agreements, including examining physical-world analogues such as
criminal trespass. Building on the discussion of what harms may arise in a
computer-centric world, it proposes a typology of computer-based or
computer-enhanced crimes against which computer-crime legislation should
protect. It then proceeds to examine why such protection is necessary for
adequate deterrence, providing a foundation for the argument that existing
CFAA reform proposals are inadequate. Part III examines other existing
proposals, presents examples of how they cannot address the concerns
raised by various types of harms that arise in the computer-crime context,
and alternatively proposes legislative reform of the mens rea requirement of
the CFAA as a solution that both protects against overbroad prosecution
and maintains the ability of private (electronic) property owners to post
virtual “no trespassing” signs and have those signs enjoy the necessary
protection of the criminal law.
I. HACKING: A (BRIEF) CONTEXTUAL HISTORY OF THE CFAA
In the (admittedly limited) scholarly discussion of the CFAA to date,
much attention is given to the expansion (both by congressional act and
judicial interpretation), potentially overbroad use, and ill-defined aspects of
the criminal acts defined by the statute and its civil analogues. Scholarship
and judicial notice have also spent substantial time discussing the logical,
implied, and literal meanings of the statute, but comparatively less
discussing the legislature’s original intent as expressed in the congressional
debates surrounding the CFAA’s adoption.
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While there remains healthy debate as to the extent to which
congressional intent should be balanced against literal interpretation—and
this Article does not seek to address such debate—legislative intent, when
evidence of it exists, is at least worthy of consideration. This is particularly
true in cases where rapidly changing technological conditions make
difficult the construction of statutes to address undesired, but not yet
technically identifiable, behavior. This Part examines the congressional
record surrounding the adoption of the 1986 amendments to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030, which introduced the name “Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” with
an eye toward how the bill’s authors attempted to use the mens rea element
of the statute to protect against overbroad use of the statute. It then
proceeds to examine the types of criminals and criminal activity the
statute’s authors did seek to criminalize, the reasons behind it. It also
discusses how subsequent criminal and civil prosecution under the CFAA
has diverged from that intent in a manner inconsistent with legislative
purpose.
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The CFAA originally was enacted as a response to the growing use of
computers, particularly by the federal government, and the growing threat
of computer crimes.17 In the nearly thirty years since its original enactment,
the CFAA has been amended multiple times and interpreted in an
increasingly expansive way by the courts. Professor Kerr has written an
excellent overview and discussion of this history,18 and rather than recount
this work, the following discussion focuses specifically on those elements
of Congress’s original intent that suggest how current jurisprudence departs
from this congressional intent and how the solutions proposed in this
Article may restore that original intent.19
According to one of its leading sponsors, Representative William J.
Hughes, the CFAA’s primary focus was “technologically sophisticated
criminal[s] who break[] into computerized data files.”20 Rep. Hughes
analogized this type of activity, committed by colloquially described

17

132 CONG. REC. 9159–61 (1986) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes).
Kerr, supra note 2, at 1564–65.
19 As discussed in the congressional debates referenced supra note 17, the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 actually was an update to 18 U.S.C. § 1030, originally enacted
as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102, 98
Stat. 1976, 2190 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.), which
already addressed some existing criminal restrictions on the unauthorized use of computers.
See also Kerr, supra note 2, at 1563–64.
20 132 CONG. REC. 9160.
18
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“hackers,” to physical-world trespass.21 In his statement, and indeed
throughout the congressional debates of the CFAA at the time, no focus was
given to criminalization of breaches of agreements between private parties
beyond those possibly implicit in the concept of trespass. Quite to the
contrary, in fact, the only notable mention of criminalization of other
activities was Rep. Hughes’s statement describing the then-proposed
legislation as “expand[ing] in an appropriate but limited manner the types of
criminal misconduct involving computers that [would] be subject to Federal
jurisdiction.”22
This discussion goes on further to illuminate why Congress felt that
these new elements of computer-based crime should be limited in scope.
Rep. Hughes’s statement discusses the fact that the CFAA amended
previous law to raise the mens rea requirement from “knowingly” to
“intentionally”23 out of specific concern for overbroad prosecution,
including the need to “preclude liability on the part of those who
inadvertently ‘stumble into’ someone else’s computer file.”24 As described
in Hughes’s statement to the House, “It is not difficult to envision a
situation in which an authorized computer user will mistakenly enter [in
violation of the statute] someone else’s computer file . . . [b]ecause the user
had ‘knowingly’ signed onto the computer in the first place . . . .”25
This discussion highlights well the concerns raised by Professor Kerr26
and other scholars27 about the potential abuse of a federal law criminalizing
“unauthorized access” to electronic information resources where the
threshold constituting lack of authorization is poorly defined. Providing a
comprehensive and enduring test in the face of rapidly changing technology
is an impossible task. Whether or not Congress realized this challenge at
the time, it nonetheless attempted to employ a proper solution—reliance on
a heightened mens rea element to protect against overbroad prosecution.
Regrettably, as discussed below, through both civil and criminal
prosecution and resulting judicial interpretations, this heightened
requirement has been whittled away.

21

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
23 H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 1 (1986).
24 132 CONG. REC. 9160.
25 Id.
26 See Kerr, supra note 2, at 1562.
27 See Matwyshyn, supra note 5; see also Letter from Laura W. Murphy et al., to
Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the House
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. (Apr. 2, 2013), available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/LetterOpposingCFAADraft_final.pdf.
22
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B. WHAT IS HACKING AND WHO ARE HACKERS?

The thesis of this Article—and its resultant policy conclusion—rests
heavily on an understanding of exactly what are the harms against which
computer-crime legislation seeks to protect.28 The legislative history of the
congressional record discussed above focuses on “a new breed of criminal:
the technologically sophisticated criminal who breaks into computerized
data files.”29 It demonstrated a particular concern with this growing class of
hackers transforming their work into profitable white collar crime,30 a
premonition that certainly has come to pass.31 This section describes a
crime “ecosystem” that has emerged comprising modern variations on Rep.
Hughes’s hacker and some views on the motivations of various elements of
that ecosystem. It also lays the groundwork for the core harms against
which I claim the CFAA drafters sought to protect.
In the early 2000s, Finnish scholar Pekka Himanen authored a
qualitative work describing three motivations for so-called “hackers.”32 In
this work, Professor Himanen describes three motivations for hackers: a
“work ethic,” a “money ethic,” and a “nethic.”33 The first motivation
contrasts what Himanen calls the traditional Protestant work ethic of work
as a means of sustenance with the “hacker work ethic” in which
technologically inclined individuals are motivated by the “intrinsic interest”
and “playful explorations” in which the accomplishment of the work is
itself the reward sought.34 The second motivation attempts to build on the
first, casting hackers’ view toward financial gain as disjunctive from
traditional capitalism, focusing on a desire to achieve only that level of
financial gain necessary to achieve individual independence after which one
derives fulfillment from accomplishment, rather than a strictly increasing
measure of fulfillment as a function of wealth accrual.35 Finally, the third
motivation asserts that hackers adopt certain social norms in their online
interactions, norms that may override other motivations or serve as primary

28

For the purposes of discussion at this point, I focus exclusively on the reasoning for
criminalization separate from the fact that the CFAA also provides analogous civil actions
for parts of its criminal prohibitions.
29 132 CONG. REC. 9160.
30 Id.
31 See generally Ross Anderson et al., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime (June 26, 2012)
(paper presented at the Eleventh Workshop on the Economics of Information Security),
available at http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~savage/papers/WEIS2012.pdf.
32
PEKKA HIMANEN, THE HACKER ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF THE INFORMATION AGE
(2001).
33 Id. at ix–x.
34 Id. at 3–4, 8.
35 Id. at 53–57.
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motivations.36 Himanen gives freedom of expression and personal privacy
as two leading examples of such norms.37
Himanen’s work may be (perhaps rightly) criticized as relying too
heavily on philosophical and political economic analysis and too weakly on
empirical evidence, particularly in addressing a question ripe for qualitative
analysis. Nonetheless, its analysis provides a useful link in drawing the
connection between the hackers driving the motivations of the 98th and
99th Congresses and the modern cybercrime ecosystem proposed in this
section. The Congresses that crafted and ultimately passed the CFAA were
concerned with technologically sophisticated youth driven primarily by
Himanen’s first motivation who might later develop into financially
motivated criminals who damage, modify, or copy information from
computer systems as a means of achieving the financial independence
depicted by Himanen’s second motivation. Himanen’s 2001 work
generally does not contemplate this possibility. However, its focus on the
hacker’s desire for financial independence to engage in activities driven by
the first motivation suggests individuals who highly value that
independence. While resorting to computer-based fraud, theft, and other
crimes might seem less likely in the Internet boom days during which
Himanen’s work was written, I suggest such activities follow quite logically
as the demand for programming and other skills possessed by hackers
diminished following the “dot-com bust” of 2001 and concurrent flooding
of the market with (at least modestly) skilled programmers. And indeed,
what limited data is available on the subject reveals that many with such
skills have resorted to participation in computer-based criminal activity
over the past several years.38 Nor have the capacities of these would-be
criminals and the potential market for such activities gone unnoticed by
organized crime.39
36

Id. at 85–89.
Id. at 89.
38 While well-known and accepted in the cybersecurity industry, there is limited
empirical data to validate these conclusions. There is some limited data available on this
from the trade press and some additional limited data from computer science researchers.
Federal and international law enforcement agencies have released (very) limited aggregate
data, and the only publicly available unclassified data set of cybersecurity “breach” incidents
provides only incident data and generally not data on the perpetrators themselves.
39 See generally Jason Franklin et al., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Internet Miscreants (Oct. 31, 2007) (paper presented at the 14th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security), available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~jfrankli/
acmccs07/ccs07_franklin_eCrime.pdf (examining the underground market for
advertisement, sale, and exchange of stolen sensitive financial information); Brian Krebs,
Shadowy Russian Firm Seen as Conduit for Cybercrime, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2007, at A15
(providing a qualitative account of businesses engaged in the trafficking of stolen consumer
data).
37
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The modern result is what I describe as a “cybercrime ecosystem,” in
which participants are stratified along levels of technical sophistication,
access to the most recent data on and methods for compromising computer
systems, and degree of sensitivity of target computer systems.40 The
teenage youths hacking the Pentagon of Rep. Hughes’s day are not so much
gone as supplanted or captured by organized activity in an interconnected
world where computer exploits are commoditized and access to large-scale
attack networks (Botnets) are controlled by a smaller set of more
sophisticated gatekeepers.
1. Security Vulnerabilities and the “Cybercrime Ecosystem”
The activities of financially motivated hackers or organizations, and to
some extent politically motivated hackers or organizations, rely heavily on
the availability of cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Colloquially known within
the industry as “exploits,” these vulnerabilities are aspects of computer
systems that provide a potential attacker the ability to engage the target
computer system in activities for which it was not intended or which the
administrators of that system have attempted to prohibit by technical means.
These are the types of “attacks” or “hacking” that Professor Kerr asserts
should form the core test of whether “unauthorized access” to a system has
occurred.41 As I describe in detail in Parts II and III, I believe Professor
Kerr’s proposal in this regard is incomplete both in that it fails to cover
certain types of activities contemplated by electronic-crimes statutes and in
that it incorrectly assumes code-based restrictions can (let alone will) fully
(or even mostly) implement the restrictive and permissive desires of system
operators. Nonetheless, the background of the code-circumvention or
exploit ecosystem is an important element of the justification for computermisuse statutes not yet discussed in the literature. This section provides an
overview of that ecosystem as a background for understanding the need for
such statutes, backed by the force of the criminal law, in the modern era.42
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities can be modeled in a lifecycle from initial
discovery to final commoditization. The emergence of vulnerabilities can

40 The concept of the “cybercrime ecosystem” was developed collaboratively by the
author and Mark Paulding, Esq., an attorney with Hogan Lovells US LLP and president and
CEO of YellowHat Laboratories, Inc. (a cybersecurity technology company).
41 Kerr, supra note 11, at 1643 (“I propose that courts . . . limit the phrase ‘without
authorization’ to the circumvention of code-based restrictions.”).
42 The cybercrime ecosystem proposed in this section, and the discussion of
cybersecurity vulnerabilities that follows, stem from the collaborative work discussed supra
in note 40 and from my ongoing research into cybersecurity regulation. See David Thaw,
The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241838.
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best be described primarily as a process of discovery by scientists rather
than one of creation by hackers. Technologists study information systems
to determine unanticipated ways in which those systems can be manipulated
to deviate from their normal operation. The methods for causing such
deviations are vulnerabilities that can be activated or “exploited” to exercise
(unauthorized) control over the system. This process of discovery, which
often focuses on technical vulnerabilities but may also include
administrative or physical vulnerabilities, is the first stage in the
vulnerability lifecycle.
While some vulnerabilities may be widely distributed soon after
discovery, most follow a lifecycle of distribution commensurate with their
ability to be exploited for strategic, financial, or social gain. Potential for
strategic gain focuses on incentives for organizations or state actors to
target specific assets. Generally these assets are targeted to enable political,
military, or economic goals, and the targets are not fungible. Potential for
financial gain creates incentives for individuals and organizations to exploit
vulnerabilities that may allow them to engage in fraud, identity theft, and
other financial crimes that can be executed through or substantially
facilitated by unauthorized access to information systems. Unlike with
strategic incentives, financially motivated attackers generally view targets
as commodities—any target capable of resulting in a “fraud conversion” is
as valuable as any other such target. Social gain follows a separate pattern,
under which actors—primarily individuals—seek to elevate their standing
within social groups by gaining unauthorized access to information
systems.
These three categories collectively suggest the incentive structures that
result in the vulnerability lifecycle. The lifecycle models the emergence of
cybersecurity threats from advanced, recently discovered attacks to highly
commoditized, well-known vulnerabilities for which readily accessible
solutions exist. Strategic incentives drive the first stage in the vulnerability
lifecycle. This “innovation” occurs when strategically oriented entities
identify or fund the identification of “new” vulnerabilities. Such entities
consistently need to identify new vulnerabilities because their incentives are
based around the idea of finding the crack in the wall of a specific target,
rather than any wall with a known (but unrepaired) breach. Consider, for
example, the case of the car thief. Most car thieves are unconcerned with
getting any one person’s specific car, but rather focus on ensuring they get
any (acceptable) car. Hence the advice about easily circumventable
security devices—if you can slow down the thief enough to make it not
worth their while compared to the next car, the thief will move on to that
next car. In contrast, the high-end or specialty-order car thief—the one
from the movie Gone in 60 Seconds who takes orders for specific cars—
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will need to be able to circumvent all the security devices for that one,
specially modified, 1966 Ford Mustang. And so it goes with informationsecurity incentives: if the attacker is strategically motivated, he will need to
identify every possible vulnerability to ensure he can deface the Arizona
State Police website, not just the website of any random police department.
Thus these goals drive the identification of new vulnerabilities, whether by
members of the organizations or governments engaged in strategic actions
themselves or by those entities contracting the services of skilled
technologists.
Once developed, these vulnerabilities create a “secondary market”
through which strategically oriented entities can “fund” their future
operations (or, perhaps, derive secondary “social” benefits in the case of
politically
motivated
organizations
like
LulzSec).43
This
“commercialization” of threats forms the second stage in the vulnerability
lifecycle, when financially motivated organizations “purchase” newly
developed vulnerabilities after initial use but before those vulnerabilities
become widely known. The key difference for financially motivated
entities lies in the lifecycle stage at which they operate. While most
financial fraud efforts do not require targeting a specific entity, such as a
given bank, they do require overcoming leading-edge security—financial
institutions, historically aware of their attractiveness as targets, are likely to
repair vulnerabilities before those compromises become well-known. For
organized criminal enterprises to profit from attacks on more fortified
financial institutions, therefore, those enterprises must be able to exploit
vulnerabilities sufficiently early in the lifecycle that enough targets have not
yet patched the vulnerability.
The final stage in the vulnerability lifecycle (historically at least) is
driven by the desire for social gain. Colloquially termed “script-kiddies,”
attackers in this category are concerned with elevating their social standing
by compromising any information system. This elevation of social standing
can take many forms, ranging from simple praise and admiration of peers to
literal gain from identity theft and (disorganized) fraud. Unlike in the case
of commercialized vulnerabilities, socially motivated attackers generally are
completely nonspecific as to what class of system they attack, and are
unconcerned with compromising only systems that are likely to employ
more current and/or advanced defensive procedures. Thus, compromising
43 LulzSec was an offshoot of the well-known hacker collective “Anonymous,” key
members of which recently pleaded guilty in a U.K. court to charges relating to the 2011
high-profile attacks against Sony Corporation and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. See
Mathew J. Schwartz, LulzSec Hackers Plead Guilty to CIA, Sony Attacks,
INFORMATIONWEEK SECURITY (Apr. 10, 2013, 9:07 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/
security/attacks/lulzsec-hackers-plead-guilty-to-cia-sony/240152582.
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these systems becomes a matter of identifying any system that does not
maintain up-to-date security, an easy task in the contemporary security
environment. The transfer mechanism from commercialized vulnerabilities
to fully commoditized vulnerabilities is not specifically clear, but the
transfer incentives can partially be defined by the limited term of usefulness
for commercialized vulnerabilities discussed above.
Once a
commercialized vulnerability becomes sufficiently well-known that it no
longer is likely to yield a financial return, maintaining the relative “secrecy”
of that vulnerability no longer confers an advantage on financially
motivated attackers and their incentives to keep it secret—and force their
constituent members to do the same—drop accordingly.
Finally, it is worth noting that certain activities, variously titled
“hacktivism,”44 may be somewhat orthogonal to the ecosystem described in
this section. As described in the sources cited in note 44, hacktivists have
many incentives for their activities, some of which may be fully
independent of (and perhaps opposite to) financial gain, which would
complicate their placement within the ecosystem considered as a linear
progression. Future work examining the cybercrime ecosystem may wish
to consider using multidimensional/multifaceted approaches.45 However
for the purposes of this Article the linear ecosystem described herein
adequately describes the majority of activities deserving of criminal
punishment described in Part II.B of this Article.

C. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROSECUTORIAL HISTORY

This section presents an overview of select criminal and civil
prosecutions under the CFAA. As noted above, more comprehensive

44 See generally Sean Gallagher, ‘Funded Hacktivism’ or Cyber-Terrorists, AmEx
Attackers Have Big Bankroll, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 30, 2013, 7:45 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/03/funded-hacktivism-or-cyber-terrorists-amexattackers-have-big-bankroll/; Peter Ludlow, What Is a ‘Hacktivist’?, N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR (Jan. 13, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/
what-is-a-hacktivist/; see also Mathew J. Schwartz, 9 Ways Hacktivists Shocked the World in
2012,
INFORMATIONWEEK
SECURITY
(Dec.
21,
2012,
9:06
AM),
http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/9-ways-hacktivists-shocked-the-world-in/
240145117.
45 See, e.g., David Bernard Thaw, Characterizing, Classifying, and Understanding
Information Security Laws and Regulations: Considerations for Policymakers and
Organizations Protecting Sensitive Information Assets 29–30 (May 12, 2011) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), available at http://www.davidthaw.com/
papers/DavidThawDissertationFinal.pdf (citing ARLENE G. TAYLOR, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INFORMATION 300 (2d ed. 2004)).
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overviews of this history already exist in the cybercrime literature,46 and
this Article does not challenge that work. Rather, this section examines
notable cases that will be used to illustrate how the revised mens rea
requirement proposed in Part III would have achieved an outcome more
consistent with the types of harms against which Congress sought—and
ought—to protect.
1. United States v. Drew (C.D. Cal. 2009)
In United States v. Drew, defendant Lori Drew was prosecuted under
the CFAA for actions stemming from violations of the website
myspace.com’s (MySpace)47 terms of service.48 Drew, the mother of a
teenage daughter, created a falsified profile on MySpace for the purpose of
harassing another teenage girl (Megan Meier) who was a classmate of
Drew’s daughter.49 The harassment via the falsified profile had such a
substantial emotional impact on Megan Meier that she ultimately
committed suicide.50
After trial, the jury convicted Drew on the sole count of “accessing a
computer involved in interstate or foreign communication without
authorization or in excess of authorization to obtain information . . . .”51
Drew subsequently moved to have the conviction vacated pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2952 on the grounds that conviction
under the CFAA, where exceeding authorized access was a function solely
of violation of a website’s terms of service, was insufficient to constitute a
misdemeanor violation of the CFAA and unconstitutional under the void46

See Kerr, supra note 2; Matwyshyn, supra note 5.
At the time of Drew’s actions, MySpace was one of the leading social networking
websites by volume of users and user activity, “receiving an estimated 230,000 new accounts
per day . . . . [E]ventually the number of profiles exceeded 400 million with over 100
million unique visitors worldwide.” United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 454–55 (C.D.
Cal. 2009). As the average user of social networking websites in the United States is now
aware, MySpace’s presence has substantially diminished and been supplanted by rival
Facebook. Readers desiring to contextualize the impact of Drew’s actions in a “modern”
setting may wish to consider what effect could result were such actions to be taken today via
Facebook.
48 Id. at 452.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 453; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006).
52 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides that “[a]fter the government closes its
evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must enter
a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. This may include a defendant challenging a conviction on
grounds involving matters of law for the court (as trier of law) to decide. See Drew, 259
F.R.D. at 456 (citing United States v. Pardue, 983 F.2d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1993)).
47
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for-vagueness53 doctrine.54
The court’s analysis suggests that the mens rea element of
§ 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA does not present a direct impediment to
Drew’s conviction.55 The court did, however, grant Drew’s Rule 29(c)
motion on the grounds that allowing violations of terms of service
agreements to sustain criminal liability under the CFAA was
unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, in substantial part
because it failed to provide sufficient definition of the criminal offense such
that “‘ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.’”56
Drew is an excellent case with which to examine the conundrum
presented by the CFAA’s current mens rea element and concept of
authorized access. Lori Drew’s actions certainly were reprehensible and
deserving of criminal punishment. This would be the case even had Megan
Meier not ultimately harmed herself; that the states may use their police
power to outlaw harassment is not a widely challenged policy decision.
Drew’s conviction under the current language of the CFAA, however,
would have presented a substantial problem—it would have required
permitting the criminalization of perhaps otherwise-lawful conduct solely
on the basis of an agreement, subject to change at any time and without
active notice, between private parties. Furthermore, this agreement (the
website terms of use) was not subject to negotiation; it was effectively, if
not in fact, a contract of adhesion. This result is often troubling for those
who read Drew—and rightly so. The criminal law is unable to hold
accountable a person for such a reprehensible act because of other acts it
may potentially criminalize. Yet, as discussed in greater detail in Part III,
Drew is also a compelling example of why the federal law should
criminalize certain actions taken using a computer. Previewed here briefly,
I argue that Drew’s actions are properly the subject of federal computercrimes legislation because her ability to engage in otherwise-unlawful
harassment and intimidation (of a minor child, no less!) was substantially
53 For a comprehensive discussion of applications of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to
the CFAA, see Kerr, supra note 2, at 1571–78.
54 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451.
55 Id. at 461–62 (“It cannot be considered a stretch of the law to hold that the owner of an
Internet website has the right to establish the extent to (and the conditions under) which
members of the public will be allowed access to information, services and/or applications
which are available on the website. . . . [W]hile public policy considerations might in turn
limit enforcement of particular restrictions, the vast majority of the courts (that have
considered the issue) have held that a website’s terms of service/use can define what is
(and/or is not) authorized access vis-a-vis that website.”) (internal citations omitted).
56 Id. at 463 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)).
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increased and made easier as a function of her unauthorized access to an
Internet-connected computer.
2. United States v. Nosal (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
In United States v. Nosal, defendant David Nosal was charged with
violations of the CFAA for conspiring with colleagues still employed at a
former employer to use their (then-current) access to exfiltrate competitive
business information for the purpose of starting a competing business
enterprise.57 Nosal filed a motion to dismiss the indictment arguing that the
CFAA does not contemplate misuse of information obtained through
(otherwise) authorized access as a criminal violation.58 The district court
initially denied the motion, but after the Ninth Circuit decided LVRC
Holdings v. Brekka,59 reheard argument and, consistent with Brekka’s
ruling, granted the motion.60 The Government appealed, and a panel of the
Ninth Circuit initially reversed the dismissal.61 Nosal applied for rehearing
by the circuit en banc, which was granted. The en banc court reversed the
original panel’s decision, affirming the district court.62
The en banc Ninth Circuit found the mens rea element of
§ 1030(a)(2)(C) to be nearly tautological.63 According to the Ninth
Circuit’s reading of the CFAA, if a person’s actions exceed authorized
access, they necessarily intended64 that their actions do so. The en banc
court upheld its reasoning from Brekka, holding that “the phrase ‘exceeds

57

United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Id. at 856.
59 LVRC Holdings v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (opting, in a civil
action brought pursuant to paragraph (g) of the CFAA, for a narrow interpretation of the
CFAA and holding that “a person uses a computer ‘without authorization’ under
§§ 1030(a)(2) and (4) when the person has not received permission to use the computer for
any purpose (such as when a hacker accesses someone’s computer without any permission),
or when the employer has rescinded permission to access the computer and the defendant
uses the computer anyway”) (emphasis added).
60 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
61 See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 676 F.3d 854 (9th
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
62 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
63 Id. at 859 (“In the case of the CFAA, the broadest provision is subsection
1030(a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime to exceed authorized access of a computer connected
to the Internet without any culpable intent.”).
64 More specifically, the person’s state of mind met the relevant threshold for the federal
mens rea degree of “intentionally,” the degree adopted in the statute. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(2) (2006). See also supra Part I, where a discussion of the legislative history
sharply contrasts this outcome (where only intent to commit the act, not intent that the act
constitute or result in unauthorized access, is required) with apparent congressional intent as
to the selection of “intentionally” as the mens rea requirement for the CFAA.
58
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authorized access’ in the CFAA does not extend to violations of use
restrictions.”65 Notably, for the purposes of this Article, the court expressly
declined to determine “whether Congress could base criminal liability on
violations of a company or website’s computer use restrictions.”66
The Nosal en banc decision well highlights the risks of an expansive
interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” in the context of the CFAA.
The majority presents several compelling examples, ranging from minors
using any of Google’s services (prior to March 1, 2012),67 to letting close
friends and relatives access one’s e-mail or Facebook accounts, to
describing oneself as “tall, dark and handsome” on an online dating website
when one is in fact “short and homely” as actions that would “earn you a
handsome orange jumpsuit.”68 The court held that these compelling
examples, Supreme Court precedent stating that courts shall not rely on the
discretion of prosecutors to save an otherwise unconstitutional statutory
provision,69 and the rule of lenity require a narrow construction of this
provision of the CFAA “so as to avoid ‘making criminal law in Congress’s
stead.’”70
The Nosal en banc dissent, while perhaps overly optimistic about the
probabilities of prosecutorial discretion as an answer to overbreadth
concerns,71 does present compelling arguments as to the reasons why the
federal law should criminalize certain computer-misuse actions. The
dissent argues that misuse of employer computer systems should be subject
to criminal penalty in certain cases, analogizing the need for criminalization

65

Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863.
Id.
67 On March 1, 2012, Google implemented a single service-wide privacy policy merging
its privacy commitments across all its web services into a single document. See Kate
Freeman, Google Changes Again, Launches One Privacy Policy to Rule Them All,
MASHABLE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/01/24/google-changes-againlaunches-one-privacy-policy-to-rule-them-all/. The Nosal en banc majority notes that prior
to this change, although “not widely known . . . Google forbade minors from using its
services.” Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861.
68 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861–62.
69 Id. at 862 (citing United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010)).
70 Id. at 862–63 (quoting United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008)).
71 See, e.g., id. at 864 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (“In ridiculing scenarios not remotely
presented by this case, the majority does a good job of knocking down straw men—farfetched hypotheticals involving neither theft nor intentional fraudulent conduct, but
innocuous violations of office policy.”); cf. Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2904-T-23TBM,
2011 WL 1742028, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011) (dismissing a former employer’s
counterclaim asserting CFAA violations for “excessive [personal] internet usage” in an
employment discrimination lawsuit brought by a former employee alleging she was
unlawfully discriminated against for becoming pregnant); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860 n.6
(majority opinion) (citing Lee).
66
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to that found in consumer banking and auto sales:
A bank teller is entitled to access a bank’s money for legitimate banking purposes, but
not to take the bank’s money for himself. A new car buyer may be entitled to take a
vehicle around the block on a test drive. But the buyer would not be entitled . . . to
take the vehicle to Mexico on a drug run.72

And indeed, federal law does criminalize these activities.73 Such
activities pose a sufficiently compelling danger to society and individuals
that Congress has made the policy decision to throw behind their prevention
the weight of the criminal law. As I discuss in detail in Part I, these
compelling examples may not translate well to the Nosal facts, which are,
perhaps, activities better suited to resolution (and prevention) through civil
litigation under theories of tort and contract.
3. United States v. John (5th Cir. 2010)
The bank-teller example presented by the dissent in Nosal mirrors that
of the case of United States v. John.74 In John, defendant Dimetriace EvaLavon John was charged with, inter alia, violation of the CFAA when, as a
Citigroup employee, she used Citigroup computers to access information
about customer accounts for the purposes of providing that information to
others to incur fraudulent charges on Citigroup customer financial
accounts.75 John appealed her jury conviction on these (and other) counts
on the grounds that the CFAA only prohibited unlawful acquisition of
information from a computer, not unlawful use following authorized
acquisition.76 The Fifth Circuit rejected this formulation of the statute,
holding that access can be limited by purpose and that “[s]he was not
authorized to access [customer] information for any and all purposes but
[rather] for limited purposes.”77 The court noted the Ninth Circuit’s
concerns in Brekka regarding potential defendants lacking constitutionally
required notice of changes in policy, reasoning alternatively that “[a]n
authorized computer user ‘has reason to know’ that he or she is not
authorized to access data or information in furtherance of a criminally
fraudulent scheme.”78
The reasoning presented here by the Fifth Circuit’s holding illustrates
72

Nosal, 676 F.3d at 865 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 656 (2006) (criminalizing “[t]heft, embezzlement, or
misapplication by bank officer or employee”); § 2312 (criminalizing “[t]ransportation of
stolen vehicles”).
74
United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
75 Id. at 269.
76 Id. at 271.
77 Id. at 272.
78 Id. at 273.
73
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well why the federal law should criminalize certain computer crimes. As I
discuss in detail in Part I, computers—like telegraph and telephone
communications systems—facilitate the perpetration of crimes in new ways
that criminals continue to discover as technology develops. As a brief
preview of my argument in that Part, I suggest that the federal law must
enable deterrence of computers and other modern information systems as
vehicles for enhancing the ability to commit existing crimes and affording
criminals the opportunity to innovate in developing new crimes.
II. CRIMINALIZATION BY CONTRACT: COMPUTER-CRIME HARMS AND
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
This Part explores the concept of defining criminal activities as a
function of agreements among private parties. This concept is neither new
nor unique to computer-related crimes; physical-world examples of private
agreements defining the boundaries of criminal activity have existed at
common law for centuries. The classic, and perhaps most well-known
example, is that of criminal trespass. What perhaps is novel, or at least
uncommon, in the context of cybercrime is that the private agreements
establishing criminal boundaries are generally complex, lengthy, difficult to
understand, and subject to change at any time and without notice.
I begin with a discussion of the concept of “authorized access” that so
permeates the scholarship and judicial opinions interpreting the CFAA. I
then proceed to contrast that concept with the view of Congress’s original
intent developed in Part I. I then examine how, together, these approaches
do and do not accord with recent CFAA jurisprudence. This discussion lays
out the problem now facing society—how to address the very real threat of
modern computer crimes while both avoiding overbreadth and protecting
the historic right of private property owners to set limits on the use of their
property by others. Equally important, this discussion also highlights the
challenge of balancing overbreadth with the need for deterring and/or
punishing socially undesirable activities. Since much of the CFAA debate
focuses on the question of private agreements as a basis for criminal
sanctions, this discussion may be most informative respecting the role of
the criminal law in maintaining predictable property relations. However, as
discussed below in Part II.B, many of the potential actions with which I
argue the federal criminal law should be concerned have serious
consequences beyond property interests. Thus, as readers consider the
implications of my analysis, I suggest that the importance of punishing
social harms (e.g., the public shaming of a victimized teenager79) may be
equally important.
79

See infra note 95.
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I first propose a typology of the types of socially undesirable activities
federal computer-crimes law should be concerned with and proceed to
discuss and compare the efficacy of civil and criminal deterrence options
for discouraging those activities.
A. THE CONCEPT OF “AUTHORIZED ACCESS”

As discussed in Part I, the key question in CFAA prosecutions often is
whether a person has engaged in activities constituting “unauthorized
access” to or “exceed[ing] [their level of] authorized access” to a computer
system.80 The mens rea element of the statute has become nearly
meaningless as a distinguishing condition, and the concept of a “protected
computer” has been extended to nearly any Internet-capable device.81 Thus
in many (if not most) CFAA cases, the question becomes whether the
defendant’s actions (regardless of that person’s intent) constitute
“unauthorized access” to a computer system or whether those actions
“exceeded authorized access” on the system.82
As discussed in the Introduction, this Article in part responds to
Professor Kerr’s invitation for dialogue regarding criminalization of
conduct involving computers and the Internet.83 Specifically, I suggest that
Professor Kerr’s contention that code-based restrictions can provide a
complete solution to “access” and “authorization” concepts in the
computer-misuse context is flawed and overlooks practical, theoretical, and
normative problems. In the section that follows, I propose a typology for
categorizing computer misuse and in Part III below I examine how
Professor Kerr’s proposal fails to address some of these concepts.
80

See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (e)(6) (2006).
See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 457–58 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that one
element of a computer being protected “is satisfied whenever a person using a computer
contacts an Internet website” and that user’s computer or information device receives or
“reads any response from that site”) (citing Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (observing the international reach of computers connected to the
Internet)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (defining a “protected computer” as one “used
in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside
the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or
communication of the United States”). Perhaps curiously, this may extend as far as
prosecuting a U.S. citizen in a domestic court under U.S. law for using a foreign computer
system in a way that otherwise is fully lawful under U.S. law but that (maybe
unintentionally) constitutes a technical violation of the terms of service of that foreign
computer system, and thus constitutes an act “exceed[ing] authorized access” on the foreign
system. Even more curious might be the case where the governing provision of the terms of
service is in a foreign language but the primary user interfaces of the website are available in
English.
82 For a more detailed discussion, see generally Kerr, supra note 11.
83 Id. at 1601.
81
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B. THE “HARMS” OF COMPUTER CRIME—AGAINST WHAT SHOULD WE
PROTECT?

This section proposes a four-part typology to describe the types of
computer-based activities with which federal computer-crime law should be
concerned. The typology derives from practical, theoretical, and normative
concerns with Professor Kerr’s “code-based restriction” test.84 In a 2003
article, Professor Kerr proposes that “courts limit access ‘without
authorization’ to access that circumvents restrictions by code.”85 I lay out
here the framework of concerns with such a test. Later, in Part III, I revisit
these concerns in the context of a fully developed background exploring
what types of computer misuse should be criminalized and why.
A code-based restriction test has practical, theoretical, and normative
problems. From a practical standpoint, it is unclear that operators of
computer systems will implement such restrictions for all types of activities
they consider inappropriate to their systems. Furthermore, it is unclear that
even the intent to implement such restrictions will yield an effective result,
both for reasons of technical competence86 and cost restriction.87 From a
theoretical standpoint, it is unclear that all the types of use restrictions a
computer system operator may wish to impose can be implemented via
code-based restrictions.88
Finally, from a normative standpoint, consider how a code-based
restriction proponent might answer the first two questions. One possible
such answer claims the concerns raised by the first two problems are de

84

Id. at 1649.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
86 This is a substantially challenging technical problem, not one easily accomplished
even with qualified personnel, and qualified personnel are not easy to find.
87 Cost restrictions are not limited to direct costs; implementing such restrictions often
substantially impacts business processes and it is well-known in the information security
industry that such impact carries high indirect cost.
88 A simple example is a social networking website’s prohibition on using the service to
threaten, harass, or intimidate another person. Threats, harassment, and intimidation are
contextual and nondeterministic in nature—thus, they cannot easily, and likely cannot with
any useful reliability, be represented in a code-based restriction. Nonetheless, they are
perfectly legitimate activities for a computer system operator to wish to restrict, and the
consequences of such activities can be so severe that ordinary tort and contract remedies are
a poor deterrent (if one at all) to potential offenders. It is also worth noting that existing
cybersecurity regulation recognizes that not all threats can be managed by technical
measures, but rather are grouped in “administrative, technical, and physical” categories. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2006) (“[E]ach agency . . . shall establish appropriate
standards . . . relating to administrative, technical, and physical safeguards . . . .”) (emphasis
added); see also, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 472 (2005) (requiring that
“respondent obtain an assessment and report . . . set[ting] forth the specific administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards that respondent has implemented”) (emphasis added).
85
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minimis and that only whatever restrictions can be implemented in a codebased restriction are proper bases for criminal liability. I suggest that such
a response is undesirable. It ignores the potential harms that are made
worse by and perhaps even entirely dependent upon modern computer and
information systems as a vehicle for undesirable activity. As I argue in the
following sections, the criminal law should be concerned about such harms.
Normatively stating that they can be ignored under a computer-misuse law
is, I suggest, a dangerous proposition opening the door to the Internet as a
vehicle to commit otherwise unlawful activity in a manner difficult (if not
impossible) to prosecute.
These considerations suggest four categories into which the types of
activities against which I claim federal computer-crime law should protect
can be grouped: (1) activities where the specific intent is the circumvention
of a code-based restriction (colloquially known as “hacking”); (2) activities
already criminalized under existing “physical-world” crimes but whereby
those activities are made easier to accomplish or their effect on victims
amplified as a function of computer and information technologies; (3)
activities that do not give rise to the need for criminal deterrence in the
physical world, but when considered in the context of computers and the
Internet or virtual environments may take on a character requiring criminal
deterrence; and (4) activities specifically unique to computers and the
Internet, which both are otherwise lawful and lack physical-world
analogues that may already provide a degree of criminal deterrence.
1. Circumvention of Code-Based Restrictions
This category describes the most “straightforward” form of computer
misuse—the classic “hacking” described by the congressional debates
discussed in Part I above. As described by Professor Kerr,89 this can
include a range of activities from simple password misuse90 employed by
technically unsophisticated rogue employees to more sophisticated
cyberattacks employed by attackers at the innovation and (to some extent)
commodification stages of the cybersecurity vulnerability lifecycle
proposed in Part I.
Many of these activities, particularly those falling closer to the
innovation stage of the cybersecurity vulnerability lifecycle, pose clear
examples of precisely the types of harmful activities with which Congress
was concerned when it passed the CFAA.91 Other activities, however, such
89

Kerr, supra note 11.
For example, the unauthorized use of another user’s password.
91 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006); supra Part I (discussing the congressional debates and
the Act’s introduction by Representative Hughes).
90
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as password sharing, technically and precisely fall under the ambit of
circumventing code-based restrictions but likely fall far afield of Congress’s
intent to criminalize unauthorized access. Consider, for example, the
teenage girl who shares her Facebook password with her mother to seek
advice on a social circumstance while away at college, or the bedridden
widower who shares his financial account password with his sister so she
can assist in managing his financial matters while he is incapacitated.
Surely these are not the types of activities Congress sought to criminalize. I
develop this idea further in my criticism of Professor Kerr’s code-based
restriction test in Part III.
2. Existing Criminal Activities Made Easier or Having
Increased Impact on Victims
This category of activities is often controversial within the context of
cyberlaw.92 It addresses those things for which the physical world already
has existing law potentially on point, but where it could be argued that such
law is inadequate to deal with computer-based or virtual-world crimes.
This inadequacy manifests as a result of: (1) the transaction cost of
engaging in the crime being substantially lowered as a function of computer
use or execution of the act in a virtual world; or (2) the damage, harm, or
other resultant injury to the victim(s) being amplified as a function of
computer use or execution of the act in a virtual world.
A common example of the first category is wire fraud. The physicalworld93 version of wire-fraud cases bears a nontrivial marginal cost of

92 Consider the classic debate regarding cyberspace and the law of the horse framed by
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Lawrence Lessig. Judge Easterbrook argued that
“the best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general
rules . . . . Teaching 100 percent of the cases on people kicked by horses will not convey the
law of torts very well.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207–08. Professor Lessig responsively argued, “[T]here is an
important general point that comes from thinking in particular about how law and
cyberspace connect.” Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999). This is because cyberspace substantially
changes a fundamental characteristic of regulability—i.e., that whereas the architecture of
the physical world (e.g., roads, rivers, buildings, etc.) has strong permanence, the
architecture of cyberspace (e.g., the computer code that implements various systems,
services, apps, etc.) has comparatively far weaker permanence and thus is more easily
subject to change. Id.; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 31–82 (2006).
93 In the context of wire (as opposed to strictly postal mail) fraud, a “physical-world”
characterization may seem idiosyncratic—wire transmissions are by nature electronic
communications. In their original form (telegraph communications), however, up to and
including the use of telephone systems, such acts still carried a substantial marginal cost of
execution just as did such fraud via postal mail. This marginal cost is what distinguishes
them from the category of “virtual-world” or “(fully) electronic” crimes discussed in this
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execution—each new “target” for the fraudulent scheme costs the
perpetrator a nontrivial amount of time or currency. By contrast, when such
a crime is executed via computer, such as by e-mail, this marginal cost is
dramatically reduced (if not de facto eliminated). Stated differently, the use
of the computer both reduces a deterrent against the crime and increases the
number of probable targets of the crime. Such schemes are so widespread
and executed at such low cost that the average reader of this (or any other
scholarly or scientific) journal need only look to the “spam” folder of his email account to find evidence of them.94
Recent years contain several notable examples95 of the second category
in the form of cyberbullying96 and harassment. In these instances, the
impact of harassment on a target victim was multiplied quite literally
thousands (if not millions) of times over as the scope of the audience was
amplified through the use of computers and the Internet. Without such
outlets, perpetrators of those crimes would be limited either to publication
via traditional press and media outlets—where at least some degree of
journalistic professional discretion should serve as a buffer—or to the
perpetrator’s self-funding of such publication, where cost provides a similar
buffer limiting harm. In the age of social networking and web selfpublishing media such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and the like, such
harm to the victim may be achieved at effectively no cost to the perpetrator.

section, because in that latter case a marginal cost of execution no longer acts as a deterrent
to the prospective criminal.
94 Barracuda Networks, a commercial provider of spam-filtering software, provides a
public report of their spam-filtering activities. As of March 4, 2013, 84% of total e-mail
processed by Barracuda’s filtering equipment was spam, based on a forty-eight-hour running
average.
Spam Data, BARRACUDACENTRAL (Mar. 4, 2013, 11:31 PM),
http://www.barracudacentral.org/data/spam; see also Charles Arthur, Interview with a Link
Spammer, REGISTER (Jan. 31, 2005, 1:41 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/
01/31/link_spamer_interview/; Paul Boutin, Interview with a Spammer, INFOWORLD (Apr.
16, 2004), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/interview-spammer-717. For a
contemporary account of spamming incentives in social media, see Graham Cluley,
Interview with a Pinterest Spammer, Earning $1000 a Day, NAKED SECURITY (Mar. 28,
2012), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/03/28/pinterest-spammer-interview/.
95 See, e.g., Brandon Baur & Reena Ninan, Bullied Teen Amanda Todd’s Video Passes
17M Views, ABCNEWS (Oct. 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/bullied-teen-amandatodds-video-passes-13m-views/story?id=17548856; Michael Pearson, Social Media Casts
Spotlight on Ohio Rape Case, CNN (Jan. 4, 2013, 2:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/
03/justice/ohio-rape-online-video; Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Social Media Threats Against
Steubenville Rape Victim Must Stop, Says Ohio Attorney General, VANCOUVER SUN (Mar.
19,
2013),
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Twitter+Facebook+threats+against+
Steubenville+rape+victim+must+stop/8122281/story.html.
96 See generally Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize
Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2097684.
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A notable physical world analogue to the second category is the
concept of sentencing enhancements for crimes committed through the use
of weapons, specifically firearms. The underlying crime is the same, but
society has made a decision to further punish that underlying crime as a
result of it being committed involving the use of a firearm—even if the
firearm never is discharged. This is similar to the case of using computers
and modern information systems in the commission of crimes.
It is upon the analysis of these two sets of examples that I suggest such
crimes should be criminalized under federal law.
3. Existing Offensive (but Not Criminal) Activities Rising to the Criminal
Level in the Electronic or Virtual Context
This category of activities addresses those actions that are not
criminalized under existing law (although they may give rise to civil
liability) but may take on a different nature when conducted electronically
or in virtual worlds, where they may rise to a level posing sufficient risk of
harm to justify a need for deterrence by criminal sanction. I suggest it
likely that as we transition through the Information Age and computers and
information systems increasingly become interwoven into our lives, we will
become more familiar with the types of activities that fall into this category.
For now, I suggest the following example: commercial advertising on
a computer system at a scale that so overwhelms the system as to render its
primary function ineffective or completely inoperable, but where the
individual acts do not themselves circumvent any code-based restriction or
otherwise constitute a criminal act. One possible example of this is the
sending of excessive e-mail advertisements (colloquially known as spam) or
the posting of commercial advertisements in blog comments to such a
degree that the blog itself becomes unmanageably long and unreadable
because the pages cannot render properly.97
4. Computer-Specific Activities that Are Otherwise Not Criminalized
The final category of activities is unique to the computer context, and
does not represent a “fixed list” of possibilities. As technology advances,
those at the innovator end of the cybersecurity vulnerabilities lifecycle will
develop new means of executing attacks on computing systems. Assuredly,
most of these discoveries will fall into the first category by involving
circumvention of at least some code-based restriction. At least a few,
however, will not, and will constitute unauthorized access only as a
function of what is (not) permissible under a computer system’s terms of

97

See Arthur, supra note 94.
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service. The technical nature of the attack will be such that code-based
restrictions will be unable to provide a “lock” that must be broken before
the attack achieves its goal, and the activities involved in the attack will
otherwise not be criminalized.
The most salient example of this is a distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attack.98 In this type of attack, many thousands or perhaps millions
of computers all attempt to access an Internet resource concurrently in an
attempt to overload that resource, rendering it unable to respond to requests.
The most common variant is a DDoS attack against a specific website, in
which these computers repeatedly request a page or pages from a website,
such that the spike in traffic is greater than the website’s servers can handle
and the website effectively becomes inaccessible. Notable DDoS attacks
have been launched by politically motivated attackers against prominent
government99 and private-sector100 websites.101 The mechanism of attack
can vary but each “attacking” computer circumvents no code-based
restriction on the website itself102 by simply attempting to access a website.
Nor do any of those computers individually (or, to the best of my
knowledge, collectively) violate any other103 state or federal statute.
98 For an overview of this concept appropriate for nontechnical audiences, see Denial-ofService Attack, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack (last
modified May 20, 2013, 1:56 AM); see also SHON HARRIS, CISSP ALL-IN-ONE EXAM GUIDE
1034–35 (5th ed. 2010) (providing additional technical detail).
99 See, e.g., Mathew J. Schwartz, LulzSec Claims Credit for CIA Site Takedown,
INFORMATIONWEEK SECURITY (June 16, 2011, 10:35 AM), http://www.information
week.com/security/cybercrime/lulzsec-claims-credit-for-cia-site-taked/230800019.
100 See, e.g., Robert Lemos, DDoS Attacks on Major Banks Causing Problems for
Customers, EWEEK (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.eweek.com/security/ddos-attacks-on-majorbanks-causing-problems-for-customers/.
101 I mention attacks on government-owned computers because of their notoriety and
importance to understanding the overall cybersecurity/cybercrime ecosystem. It is worth
noting, however, that attacks against (at least) federal government computer systems are
handled under separate provisions of the CFAA, see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) & (a)(3) (2006),
which have received substantially less scrutiny by federal appellate courts. While the
structure of the language in the statute is similar, different interests are protected when
government computers are at risk than when private computers are at risk. For the purposes
of this Article, I limit the scope of my examination and its resultant proposed reform to those
provisions of the CFAA pertaining to private computer and information systems.
102 Some DDoS attacks are orchestrated using “innocent” third-party computers onto
which attackers have (possibly by circumventing a code-based restriction) installed software
that enables those computers to be remotely instructed to participate in the attack by
accessing the target website at a given time. While such circumvention may constitute
unauthorized access by circumvention of a code-based restriction as pertains to the innocent
third party, it does not as pertains to the target of the attack.
103 An argument could be constructed that this constitutes criminal harassment or assault.
However, I think this argument is tenuous both because of the lack of requisite mens rea to
cause harm or intimidation to a specific person and because of the lack of requisite effect in
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These types of computer-specific actions that clearly result in harm
(i.e., the unavailability of a website) but are not otherwise criminalized but
for the terms of service of a website (which can prohibit the execution of a
DDoS attack or any otherwise-authorized access part of a scheme to disable
or disrupt access to the website) are exactly the types of activities against
which computer-specific federal criminal law should protect. The challenge
in protecting against them, however, is that they are ever-changing as
technology evolves and difficult to define as a class a priori—particularly
without running the risk of opening up avenues for overbroad prosecution.
Although beyond the scope of this Article, I suggest to the reader here and
later in Part III.C that this type of problem in law may present an interesting
crossover with questions of administrative law and delegation of legislative
authority.
C. EFFECTIVE PREVENTION: CRIMINALIZATION VS. PRIVATE OPTIONS

The U.S. legal system provides two primary categories of law for the
deterrence of socially undesirable actions by private individuals: private
law, under which cost may be associated with action through liability under
contract or at tort; and criminalization, under which actions are prohibited
by the state under penalty of fine, imprisonment, or other use of the police
power.104 These two categories serve different—although sometimes
overlapping105—purposes. Private liability established under tort or
contract law generally concerns circumstances under which one individual’s
actions cause redressable harm to another. Tort law, for example, may also
serve a deterrent purpose,106 but tort law’s primary purpose concerns
that regard. Certain exceptional cases—e.g., an attack on a celebrity or political candidate’s
website—might qualify under this standard, but I think criminal prosecution on that basis
seems a weak argument at law, and even weaker if tried to a lay jury where a truly “harmed”
victim cannot be presented.
104 Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative
Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 720 (2008).
105 Notably, the CFAA has a civil analogue, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). However, it applies
only to actions that result in direct damages and thus excludes the bulk of the matters
discussed in this Article and elsewhere giving rise to overbreadth concerns in the criminal
context. Additionally, criminal prosecutions under the CFAA paragraphs for which
subsection (g) provides civil liability less commonly involve violations of use agreements,
and when those prosecutions do involve such violations, it is usually in the context of a
larger otherwise-criminal scheme, such as employees engaged in fraud or larceny
conspiracies. See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271–73 (5th Cir. 2010).
106 See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854, 857 (Cal. 1979) (“The allowance of
punitive damages in [motor vehicle collision] cases may well be appropriate because of
another reason, namely, to deter similar future conduct, the ‘incalculable cost’ of which is
well documented. [California law] expressly provid[ed] that punitive damages may be
recovered ‘for the sake of example.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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maintenance of a reasonable standard of care among actors in society.107
Contract law primarily is concerned with the establishment of
individualized agreements between and among private parties, incurring
rights and obligations not part of generalized “standards of care” espoused
in tort law. Like tort, however, contract law primarily concerns itself with
redress for breach of specific actions. Neither of these private law
alternatives108 focuses on the general prevention of socially undesirable
activities or activities for which compensation cannot be provided.
The criminal law, by contrast, concerns the activities society most
strongly seeks to prevent. While ranging in degrees of severity, criminal
law generally seeks to deter activities that unjustifiably or inexcusably
cause substantial harm to individual or public interests.109 These types of
harms may110 or may not111 generally have direct civil liability analogues,
but in all cases focus on actions the state wishes to prevent. As described
by Professor Kenneth Simons, criminal law can be distinguished from tort
law in that “criminal law prohibits ‘public’ wrongs and tort law ‘private’
wrongs.”112
This section responds, in part, to criticisms that the concept of website
terms of service and other usage agreements constitute private agreements
between private parties concerning private matters—and thus are not the
proper province of the criminal law. It articulates the deterrence character
of each alternative in the context of the cybersecurity ecosystem and the
107 See, e.g., Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93 (N.Y. 1919) (describing a “duty to adopt
all reasonable precautions to minimize the resulting perils [from an action]”).
108 For the purposes of this Article, I do not consider the private law alternative of noncriminal civil penalties (e.g., parking tickets) because an appropriate infrastructure (e.g., an
Internet driver’s license) does not exist for the administration of such penalties.
Furthermore, for at least some of the categories of actors described herein (e.g., sophisticated
innovator/code-based restriction circumvention attackers), a civil penalty system even with
the proper infrastructure would likely be a highly ineffective deterrent as those would be
precisely the people most capable of circumventing the system.
109 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 2009) (“The general purposes of the
provisions of this chapter are: 1. To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably
causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests . . . .”); see also, e.g.,
Criminal Justice Codification, Revision and Reform Act of 1973, S. 1, 93d Cong. § 1-1A.2
(“General Purposes: The purpose of this code is to establish order with justice so that the
nation and its people may be secure in their persons, property, relationships, and other
interests.”). These selected excerpts were suggested in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 156–57 (7th ed. 2001).
110 For example, homicide and its tort analogue of wrongful death liability.
111 For example, adultery, bigamy, perjury, and certain inchoate offenses. However,
under the doctrine of negligence per se, if actual damages occur, civil liability may
nonetheless result unless the jurisdiction’s legislature has expressly repudiated this doctrine.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (2010).
112 Simons, supra note 104, at 720.
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cybercrime typology described in Parts I and II.B above, and identifies both
why private law does not present an effective deterrence mechanism and
why the actions described therein are “deserving of punishment” to the
degree provided for by the criminal law.
1. Private Law (Tort and Contract) Deterrence of Cybercrime
As described above, private law primarily concerns the maintenance of
appropriate standards of care (conduct) among actors in society and the
preservation of duties assumed in valid agreements. Deterrence in this
context thus depends on a combination of several elements. First, there
must be a cognizable harm (most often one that is financially measurable)113
actually and proximately resulting from the tortious act or directly resulting
from the breach. Second, the party aggrieved by this act or breach must be
both willing and able to initiate and follow through with civil prosecution.
Third, the aggrieved party must have the capacity through civil procedure to
identify the party responsible for the tortious and/or breaching conduct.
Fourth, and most importantly, the allegedly responsible party must have the
means to compensate the aggrieved party financially, lest it become
“judgment proof” and the aggrieved party’s costs in civil prosecution
exceed its expected recovery.
In the cybercrime context, the concept of a cognizable harm that is
financially measurable may be difficult to ascertain. Unlike in the
physical-crimes context, when an attacker “accesses (and acquires)
information,” he does not necessarily deprive the aggrieved party of that
information. The marginal cost of copying electronic data is generally
trivial; it is in fact a more complex operation to both copy and completely
remove information from a computer system than it is only to copy such
information.114 In the cases where an attacker does modify or delete data,
ascertaining the value of that data may be complex or even impossible.115
113 The need for a harm to be financially measurable stems from the award of damages as
the primary “cost” to the bad actor (i.e., tortfeasor or breaching party). If damages cannot
properly be measured, except in contract cases where liquidated damages provisions may
govern, the deterrent effect is substantially reduced because the potential tortfeasor or
potential breaching party need not fear judgment against him.
114 Copying and subsequent deletion of data—the electronic equivalent of absconding
with a physical-world file from a filing cabinet—requires two operations, the latter of which
is more likely to trigger automated warnings and/or leave traceable evidence. See infra note
115. Copying such data—the electronic equivalent of taking the file, bringing it to a
photocopier, and then replacing it—involves only one operation and is less likely to trigger
automated warnings and/or leave traceable evidence. See infra note 115. As evidenced by
the physical-world analogues presented here, the electronic equivalents have exactly inverse
levels of difficulty and risk from their physical-world counterparts.
115 Most modern computer operating systems have the capability to monitor file access,
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While certain types of data, such as trade secrets or prepatent inventions,
may have measurable economic value, the value of other data—such as
custodial data,116 personal files, or software applications117 and system
configuration files118—may be limited to the measurement of indirect
costs.119 When the industry standard expects organizations to maintain
resiliency protocols for their information systems, determining the marginal
cost in activating those protocols may be difficult. If an external firm is
engaged, the costs may be more calculable, but when internal staff and
resources—already maintained by the organization for other reasons—are
used, cost determination may be more complicated. While on balance these
factors would seem to militate against the costs of civil litigation in many
cases, it bears note that in recent months litigants increasingly have
attempted to advance such claims.120
These reasons also suggest a lack of willingness on the part of
potential civil litigants to engage in civil prosecution. The potential
execution, modification, and deletion operations. This capacity, part of the broader category
of “auditing” functions in cybersecurity, is resource intensive because it requires both realtime constant monitoring and the maintenance of records of actions. Many software
applications on a computer will access (read but not modify data from) a file, and will do so
with greater frequency than they will delete data from that file. Far fewer applications will
delete files, and they will do so with much less frequency than they access files. For this
reason, to the extent a computer system operator enables auditing functions, system
performance constraints strongly mitigate in favor of enabling auditing functions only for
file deletion and not for both file deletion and file access.
116 “Custodial data” is a term adopted by the information security industry to refer to
data, such as consumers’ personal information, that is provided to another party for specific
purposes (e.g., financial account information for an Internet-based purchase). The term
“data custodian” refers to the party responsible for the maintenance of that data consistent
with applicable law. See Harris, supra note 98, at 125–26. Industry-standard practice
dictates that custodial data should be redundantly available through backup measures in the
event of a system compromise or other failure. See id. at 809–12.
117 Software applications should be reinstallable from their original installation source; it
is industry-standard practice to maintain appropriate reinstallation media and/or other backup
methods. See id. at 805–06.
118 Practices similar to those described supra in note 117 likewise apply to system
configuration files.
119 For example, business disruption, labor, and other costs associated with system
restoration from backups; regulatory compliance costs; etc.
120 See, e.g., Harris v. comScore, Inc., No. 11 C 5807, 2013 WL 1339262, at *10 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 2, 2013) (granting partial class certification in suit against manufacturer of alleged
“tracking software” for, inter alia, claims of damages to plaintiff class members’ computers
resulting from installation and/or use of the tracking software); Sharma v. Howard Cnty.,
No. 12-cv-2269-JKB, 2013 WL 530948, at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 12, 2013) (dismissing for failure
to state a claim, but recognizing in dicta that a claim for consequential damages under the
CFAA’s civil tort provision may include the costs of a responsive investigation); Oracle
Am., Inc. v. Serv. Key, LLC, No. C 12-00790 SBA, 2012 WL 6019580, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 3, 2012).
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reputational risks of engaging in public litigation further compound this
probable reticence. A prospective corporate litigant, for example, in
initiating civil prosecution against a cybertortfeasor, effectively reveals to
the public that its defensive cybersecurity measures were inadequate to stop
the alleged attacker. Furthermore, the litigation itself bears costs—costs the
prospective litigant must weigh against the likelihood of recovery. As
discussed above in Part I.B cybercriminals do not represent a group likely
to pay a civil judgment, either because they are individuals who lack the
resources to do so or because they comprise organized crime in foreign
jurisdictions beyond the (effective) reach of U.S. civil courts. Finally, as
others have discussed, cybercriminals are often effective at disguising their
identities, confounding the capacities of prospective civil litigants to
identify prospective tortfeasors.121
This discussion primarily addresses cybercrime activity in the first
category of the typology described above. With respect to the remaining
categories, I suggest that individuals will generally engage in activities of
these types, and that such individuals will not likely have the capacity to
pay civil judgments in amounts sufficient to allow equally financially
limited parties the capacity to prosecute a civil claim. 122 One possible
exception is the category of commercial entities engaging in advertising
activities as described in the third category above. However, these
activities represent a sufficiently small percentage of potential socially
undesirable acts and are sufficiently distinguishable from other types of acts
that even if successfully prosecuted, they seem unlikely to have a deterrent
effect outside the limited scope of commercial advertising. At this early
stage in development of industries such as online behavior advertising, it is
likely premature to predict the deterrence effect on such commercial
entities.
Collectively, these factors—particularly the judgment-proof nature of
most cybercriminals—strongly suggest that civil litigation is unlikely to be
an effective deterrent in the context of the cybersecurity ecosystem and the
typology of cybercrime and cybercriminals presented here. Reticence to
prosecute, inability to recover even compensatory (let alone punitive)
damages, and the high costs of and possible technical barriers to
prosecution all suggest that an alternative method of deterrence is required
to disincentivize the types of cybercrime activities I suggest society does
121

Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and
Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 470 (2012).
122 Prospective litigants would likely need to engage counsel on a contingent-fee basis,
but traditionally judgment-proof defendants such as the average citizen are unlikely to have
either sufficient resources or reason to carry the types of insurance that would enable
payment of judgments in sufficient amounts to cover the costs of this type of litigation.

2013]

CRIMINALIZING HACKING, NOT DATING

939

have an interest in preventing.
2. Criminal Law Deterrence
I consider the possible effect of deterrence through criminal law in the
context of three prospective categories of cybercriminals: (1) hackers, who
engage in activities in categories 1 or 4 above (regardless of motivation);123
(2) individuals, who engage in activities in category 2 above; and (3)
individuals and entities who engage in activities in category 3 above. For
each of these categories, I consider the effect of employing the police power
and threat of criminal penalties as a deterrent.
As discussed in the previous subsection, hackers present perhaps the
most challenging deterrence problem in that they both may be difficult to
identify and may be located in foreign jurisdictions. Both these factors
certainly are challenges to the criminal law. Criminal law enforcement,
however, has substantially better resources at its disposal than private
parties both for the investigative activities required to identify hackers and
the interjurisdictional activities124 required to extend the law’s reach and
deterrent effect to parties situated outside the territorial United States.125
The deterrent effect of the criminal law is not hampered by the financial
insolvency of hackers; the effect of its primary method of punishment (e.g.,
imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty) does not vary with the
financial capacities of the alleged criminal. Admittedly, I am unaware of
any empirical evidence as to the efficacy of threat of criminal punishment in
the cybercrime context.126 However, the analytical prospects are more

123

For the purposes of this analysis, I suggest that whether the motivation is for personal
enrichment, financial gain, or political statement (see supra Part I.B) is irrelevant as pertains
to the possible deterrent effect of criminal sanctions relative to that of private law deterrents.
In all three cases, the relative reach of the criminal law and the enhanced costs
criminalization brings relative to civil liability do not vary based on the hacker’s motivation.
While that motivation may change the prospective cybercriminal’s calculus as to whether the
risks of prosecution outweigh the advantages of the act, the difference within each category
relative to its private law counterpart will proportionally be the same.
124 For example, engagement of extradition and other international law enforcement
procedures.
125 Brian Krebs, Alleged Romanian Subway Hackers Were Lured to U.S., KREBS ON
SECURITY (June 6, 2012), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/06/alleged-romanian-subwayhackers-were-lured-to-u-s/.
126 Much contemporary criminal deterrence literature focuses on the efficacy of
deterrence measures at preventing physical-world (as opposed to electronic) crimes,
particularly crimes against persons and/or property crimes. See generally Daniel S. Nagin,
Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST.
1 (1998); see also generally Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of
Imprisonment, in CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 43, 43–94 (Philip J.
Cook et al. eds., 2011).
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favorable than private law alternatives and at least some such law
enforcement efforts have proven effective.127
Individuals engaging in acts from category 2, actions already
criminalized but made easier, or those where the effect on the victim(s) is
amplified through the use of computers, present perhaps the easiest cases to
differentiate the efficacy of criminal law versus private law deterrence. As
noted above, these actors comprise individuals who are generally judgmentproof in a civil litigation from a financial perspective. The cases and
hypotheticals considered in this Article128 predominantly involve
individuals physically present in the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. While the limitations of existing empirical evidence discussed
above with respect to hackers still apply to this category, the difficulties in
identifying alleged perpetrators and securing them in police custody are
substantially reduced (if not trivial). Notwithstanding the absence of
empirical evidence on the deterrent effect of criminal sanction in the
cybercrime context, this suggests a substantially more effective mode of
deterrence than the unlikely probability of civil prosecution.
Individuals and organizations engaging in acts from category 3,
actions that are not criminal in the physical-world context but that may
justify criminal deterrence in the context of cybercrime, present a
challenging question. In the example presented above (overzealous
advertising that renders ineffective a computer system’s intended
operation), the commercial nature of the actor likely (as discussed above)
increases the probable efficacy of private law deterrence. Additionally,
such action seems well suited to tort remedies—there is a redressable harm
resulting from the socially undesirable actions. While compelling, I suggest
this approach focuses too much on the commercial nature of the alleged
offender and too little on the trespassory nature of the offender’s action.
Consider, for example, the physical-world analogue. If a neighborhood
storeowner entered onto a homeowner’s property and placed a single
advertising billboard (without permission) on the homeowner’s lawn, this
action—while technically constituting trespass—would likely be better
suited to resolution through civil action. Alternatively, however, if that
same storeowner placed 500 such billboards, completely blockading the
homeowner’s egress from her residence, it seems more probable that law
127 See supra note 125; see also Authorities Bust $72 Million Dollar Conficker Fraud
Ring, INFOSEC ISLAND (June 27, 2011), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/14789Authorities-Bust-72-Million-Dollar-Conficker-Fraud-Ring.html.
128 Generally speaking, the most prominent examples are those of the malicious insider
in an organization using his access to engage in fraud or similar activities (the insider threat),
and the malicious individual attempting to harass, threaten, or intimidate another person
through the use of social media and related Internet-based communications (the cyberbully).
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enforcement would become involved and criminal trespass charges found
appropriate. Placing 500 billboards on a homeowner’s lawn is, of course, a
completely implausible scenario. In the context of Internet advertising,
however, through practices such as e-mail spam129 or advertising overtaking
commenting threads on blogs,130 the electronic equivalent of this scenario is
not only plausible, but a well-known phenomenon. While it remains an
open question whether such activity is deserving of criminal punishment,131
certainly the threat of imprisonment will give pause to at least some actors
who otherwise may consider themselves judgment proof.
Finally, consider the case of use restrictions on a website. In the
physical world, homeowners may allow certain persons limited access to
their property for limited purposes at limited times (e.g., a cleaning service
may be permitted to enter their homes on Friday afternoons to clean, but
may neither enter on Thursdays nor enter with the purpose of observing and
taking pictures of private areas of the homes while cleaning). If the
cleaning service violates these permissions, for example by entering on a
Thursday, it may in fact be violating the applicable criminal trespass
statute.132 As computer and information systems grow increasingly
complex through the advent of social media and portable Internet-enabled
devices, the degree to which system operators will have the organizational
capacity to (assuming it is even computationally possible to) implement all
the code-based restrictions necessary to effect the virtual-world equivalents
of these types of restrictions diminishes. Similar physical-world analogies
apply for the degree to which a patient, prior to surgery, consents to the
surgeon “assaulting” her person, or to which a homeowner permits a
landscape decorator to make modifications of a certain sort to the property.
In summary, this Part asserts that in the current ecosystem of
cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and considering the typology of potential
cybercriminals proposed from the background presented in Part II, private
law simply is an insufficient deterrent. It fails sufficiently to deter the types
of harmful activities Congress sought to prevent when originally
considering the CFAA, and it will fail to deter the types of harmful
activities Congress may not specifically have considered in 1986, but that I
suggest are properly the province of the federal criminal law. Together
See Arthur, supra note 94.
See id.
131 The question of whether such activity deserves criminal punishment need not be
answered for the purposes of this discussion. Furthermore, as discussed in Part III, my
proposed reform leaves the decision whether to criminalize such activities properly where it
belongs—in the hands of the legislature(s)—separate from the question of whether terms of
service or other private agreements may trigger criminal enforcement as a general rule.
132 This varies by jurisdiction.
129
130
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with Part I, this Part argues that activities of this latter type—activities
falling into categories 2, 3, and possibly 4 above—are both deserving of
criminal punishment and require criminalization to achieve the appropriate
level of deterrence.
Additionally, this Part identifies how the scope of activities deserving
of punishment includes activities that cannot be fully captured by codebased restrictions. Further, it illuminates how, as discussed in Part I and by
other scholars, terms-of-service-based restrictions under current broader
CFAA interpretations capture activities surely not intended by Congress to
fall under the scope of criminal sanction. In the final Part of this Article, I
directly consider existing proposals to address this disjunction between
activities deserving of punishment and what broader interpretations of the
CFAA contemplate criminalizing, detail how those proposals manifest the
problems described above, and propose an alternative revision to the
CFAA.
III. CRIMINALIZING (ONLY) HACKING: MENS REA AS A SOLUTION
Parts I and II of this Article present a backdrop of socially undesirable
activity in the context of computers and the modern Internet. They discuss
the shortcomings of the current state of the CFAA, concurring with existing
scholarship arguing that it is overbroad in the activity it potentially
criminalizes. This background suggests, however, that notwithstanding the
risks of overbreadth, there still exist harms against which Congress ought
(and to at least some extent, clearly did intend)133 to protect. Further, the
activities leading to many of these harms cannot be proscribed and
adequately deterred without the ability of computing system operators to
define the boundaries of authorized access—the boundaries of their “private
property”—in terms-of-service and similar agreements limiting the
purposes for which they allow entrants onto their property.
This Part proceeds first by examining two existing proposals,
Professor Kerr’s code-based restriction test and Representative Lofgren’s
proposed express ban on private agreements defining authorized access, in
the context of the activities and resulting harms outlined in Parts I and II. It
identifies how each of these proposals falls short of the desired protection
according to the reasoning described above. It then concludes by proposing
an alternative solution—refinement of the mens rea element of the CFAA.
This is a proposal both consistent with the 1986 congressional hearings and

133 Specifically, this includes at least those types of activities in category 4 of the
typology presented in Part II that clearly involve interference with or disruption of
computing and information systems, but do so without violating any level of authorized
access except for the terms of service or other private agreements of those systems.
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with the protections against overbroad prosecution and socially undesirable
activity outlined in this Article.
A. KERR’S CODE-BASED RESTRICTION TEST

As discussed above,134 Professor Kerr proposed in a 2003 article a test
for interpretation of the scope of access and authorization based on the
concept of circumventing code-based restrictions, or aspects of how “the
[computer] owner or her agent codes the computer’s software so that the
particular user has a limited set of privileges on the computer.”135
Specifically, Professor Kerr proposes that courts interpret the term “access”
to be subject to the terms of private agreements governing use, but that the
term “(without) authorization” be limited to circumvention of these codebased restrictions.136 Professor Kerr’s proposed test has merit in that it
would substantially address the problem of potentially overbroad
prosecution under computer-misuse statutes. The test fails, however, in that
it cannot even address all the types of computer misuse Congress originally
contemplated in the legislative hearings surrounding adoption of the CFAA,
let alone new forms of computer misuse against which I argue the criminal
law should (continue to) protect.
As discussed above in Part II.B, I suggest practical, theoretical, and
normative concerns with a code-based restriction test. I identify practical
concerns primarily relating to cost and availability of requisite skill required
to implement the desired code-based restrictions. One might respond to this
concern by arguing that it is not the government’s role to design criminal
law to solve business problems at the expense of potentially overbroad
prosecution. For the sake of argument, assume this response is satisfactory.
The code-based restriction test still fails to address the theoretical concerns
I present above. Simply restated, not every access restriction that a
computer system operator may validly wish to implement can be
implemented in code.137 Some restrictions involve nondeterministic
problems, such as the identification of criminally harassing and/or
threatening speech, which cannot reliably be implemented in a computer
program. This concept is well recognized in cybersecurity and dataprotection regulation where, for example, protective measures required of
regulated entities are divided into “administrative, technical, and physical”
measures.138

134
135
136
137
138

See supra Part II.B.1.
Kerr, supra note 11, at 1644.
Id. at 1643.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, as noted in Part II.B above, I assert that normative
concerns mitigate against limiting the types of restrictions a computer
system operator may put in place to those that can be implemented in code.
Such a proposition would be analogous to limiting the protections of
criminal (physical) trespass only to those security measures that can
physically prevent a person from entering onto property. The law of
criminal trespass does not require landowners to erect impenetrable walls
around their property; nor should the law of computer misuse and electronic
trespass. To do otherwise would strip the protections of computer-misuse
statutes such as the CFAA and create an “open season” for enterprising
hackers,139 spammers, cyberbullies, and others with malicious intent.
B. REPRESENTATIVE ZOE LOFGREN’S PROPOSED REFORM

On January 15, 2013, in partial response to the events surrounding the
suicide of noted Internet entrepreneur Aaron Swartz,140 Representative Zoe
Lofgren prepared draft legislation (colloquially known as Aaron’s Law)141
proposing expressly to preclude determination of unauthorized access under
the CFAA based on “violation of an agreement . . . or contractual

139 Consider again the example of the DDoS attack, discussed above in Part II.B.4. No
code-based circumvention of the target system occurs when a DDoS attack is executed—the
attacking computers only access publicly available webpages without violating any codebased restrictions. The net result, however, is to disable and render unusable the target
system, a condition clearly contemplated by Congress as impermissible in § 1030(a)(5)(A)
of the CFAA. A DDoS attack precisely is the “knowing[] . . . transmission of a program,
information, code, or command” that “intentionally causes damage.”
18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A) (2006). The only missing element here, under a code-based restriction test,
is that the website operator has no effective means to implement code, making the DDoS
attack “without authorization” because there presently do not exist any viable technical
defenses against a properly executed DDoS attack. A code-based restriction test thus
effectively grants authorization to attackers to disable at will any website they choose.
Surely this cannot be Congress’s intent; Representative William J. Hughes described
“subsection 1030(a)(5) [as] a malicious mischief provision, . . . designed to provide penalties
for those who intentionally damage or destroy computerized data belonging to another.” 132
CONG. REC. 9160 (1986). Rendering data inaccessible and/or disrupting a business’s ability
to transact electronically with its customers is an effective means of damaging the data.
Indeed, Representative Hughes specifically stated that the sponsors of the CFAA agreed that
“the concept of ‘loss’ embodied in this [provision] will not be limited solely to the cost of
actual repairs,” but would also include “the cost of lost computer time.” 132 CONG. REC.
7817 (1986). Representative Hughes’s statement suggests at least that such disruption may
constitute the basis for the offense.
140 See supra note 12.
141 Hayley Tsukayama, Demand Progress Calls for Change to Computer Hacking Law
#thecircuit, POST TECH (Jan. 17, 2013, 2:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
post-tech/post/demand-progress-calls-for-change-to-computer-hacking-law-thecircuit/2013/
01/17/4cde44d8-60d2-11e2-9940-6fc488f3fecd_blog.html.
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provision.”142 Representative Lofgren’s proposal, while laudable for its
attempt to address the problems of overbroad prosecution under the CFAA,
fails to provide a workable solution for precisely the same reasons
discussed above with respect to Professor Kerr’s code-based restriction test.
Aaron’s Law as revised adopts the code-based restriction test. Leading
cybersecurity technical professionals and attorneys echoed concerns similar
to those presented here shortly after Representative Lofgren announced her
proposed reform, which, even in its original form, effectively adopted the
code-based restriction test.143
C. MENS REA REFORM: A RESPONSIVE RETURN TO CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT

With what, then, are we left to balance the risks of overbroad
prosecution and the damage caused by aggressive, modern cybercriminals?
As discussed above in Part I.A, the CFAA’s congressional sponsors
discussed in 1986 changes heightening the mens rea requirement in the
statute to avoid criminalizing accidental or unintentional unauthorized
access. Unfortunately, as discussed later in Part I, the courts have
interpreted the CFAA’s mens rea element to be nearly tautological. In
summary, it fails to separate the intent to commit the act that constitutes or
results in unauthorized access from the intent actually to disregard
authorization or access restrictions.144 I propose resolving the challenges
posed here through legislative reform of the mens rea element, revising it to
ensure this separation and appending an additional requirement designed to
protect against future unpredictable and overbroad prosecution as
computing and information systems increasingly integrate into our lives and
persons.
The result is a two-part mens rea test with respect to whether the acts
in question constitute unauthorized access. The first part requires not only
that the access in question be in violation of a technical or other provisional
access restriction, but also that the actor’s intent be specifically that her
actions would violate the given restriction. A key element of this test is that

142 H.R. 18, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.lofgren.house.gov/images/
stories/pdf/aarons%20law%20revised%20draft%20013013.pdf.
143 Taylor Armerding, ‘Aaron’s Law’ Could Have Unintended Consequences, CSO
SECURITY AND RISK (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.csoonline.com/article/727023/-aaron-s-lawcould-have-unintended-consequences.
144 By way of analogy to physical-world crimes, the CFAA fails to separate the intent
(generally) to swing one’s arm from the intent that by swinging one’s arm, one will connect
with the face of another person in a manner designed to cause injury to that person. The first
generally will fail to satisfy mens rea requirements for intentional assault consummated by
battery, whereas the latter will satisfy those requirements.
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the actor must be on actual notice of the restriction. While there is no clear
bright line as to what constitutes proper notice and what does not, certainly
a term buried in the middle of a paragraph in a 25,000-word document
should not reasonably constitute actual notice.145 Congress may look to the
work of scientists and scholars in the privacy community, which has made
substantial progress over the past several years in developing proposals for
providing notice of key terms in privacy policies.146 My proposal does not
speak to whether other provisions not noticed so prominently may still have
binding effect in civil matters; it addresses under what circumstances
criminal prosecution may advance under the CFAA where unauthorized
access is conditioned on an agreement term as opposed to circumvention of
a code-based restriction.
The second part of my proposed reform requires that the act in
question be in furtherance of one of a specifically prohibited list of actions,
which Congress may update from time to time147 or in furtherance of an act
otherwise criminalized under state or federal law. The concept of a
specifically prohibited list allows Congress the flexibility to make policy
decisions and criminalize acts it deems appropriate from categories 3 and 4
of the typology presented in Part II.B. Thus for matters unique to the
computer-crimes space, Congress may create criminal liability as necessary.
I note that this is to some extent compatible with Professor Kerr’s
suggestion of “replac[ing] one-size-fits-all unauthorized access statutes with
new statutes that explicitly prohibit particular types of computer misuse.”148
The alternative attachment to existing criminal law allows the CFAA still to
afford protection for acts the law already finds impermissible, but which
may be more easily accomplished or their effects aggravated by the use of
computers and the Internet (category 2 of the typology presented above). It
145 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies,
4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 540, 543 (2008); see also An Interview with David
Vladeck of the F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER (Aug. 5, 2009, 2:24 PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/an-interview-with-david-vladeck-of-theftc/.
146 See supra note 15.
147 In practice, the state of cybercrime likely would advance more quickly than a
legislature could respond, and such a task may ultimately fall to an administrative agency. It
is a separate, if interesting, question outside the scope of this Article as to whether delegation
of determinations as to what constitutes a crime can survive scrutiny under the Mistretta v.
United States nondelegation doctrine test. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)
(permitting Congress to allow the U.S. Sentencing Commission to determine the
recommended ranges of sentences established in the Sentencing Guidelines and holding that
Congress need only “‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person
or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform’”) (quoting
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
148 Kerr, supra note 11, at 1643.
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also allows Congress the flexibility to criminalize only those code-based
circumventions that are in furtherance of some otherwise-unlawful act
(which would be captured under this attachment to existing criminal law),
or all (intentional) circumventions of code-based restrictions regardless of
purpose (by adding that provision to the specifically prohibited actions list).
The result is a CFAA under which each of the following scenarios
would result in criminal liability: the attacker trying to damage computer
systems, whether by code-based circumvention or other method; the
malicious insider attempting to defraud the customers of their employer
bank; the cyberbully attempting to harass and intimidate his victim by
publicly disseminating a video of her physical abuse in the hopes it “goes
viral”; and the ex-employee using his or her not-yet-revoked access
credentials to steal valuable trade secrets for sale to a competitor. Each of
these acts is either on the specifically prohibited list or in furtherance of
some activity otherwise criminalized by state or federal law. In each case,
the perpetrator’s actions are reprehensible, deserving of criminal
punishment, and worthy of deterrence by the threat of criminal sanction.
Contrast these results with those of the elderly gentleman who
misrepresents himself as tall, dark, and handsome (when he, in fact, does
not quite meet these characteristics) and the teenager at college who shares
her Facebook password with her mother, whose acts are neither on the
specifically prohibited list nor in furtherance of some otherwise criminal
act. Neither of these acts, nor the many others discussed by the courts,149
constitutes such reprehensible conduct. And accordingly, under this revised
mens rea test, such acts would not trigger liability for unauthorized access.
IV. CONCLUSION
Criminal deterrence of computer misuse presents a challenging
problem because it introduces two new concepts, both of which must be
addressed in a rapidly developing environment, the basic assumptions of
which may change far more quickly than legislatures can act. The first are
new, computer-specific crimes that did not exist before the introduction of
this technology or that are directed toward interference with the technology
itself. The second are existing actions, which may or may not already be
criminalized, but which are made so much easier by the (mis)use of
computers and the impact on victims potentially so amplified by that misuse
that this misuse is itself worthy of punishment under and requires the
deterrent force of the criminal law.
149

United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also Lee
v. PMSI, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2904-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 1742028, at *1–3 (M.D. Fla. May 6,
2011).
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In such circumstances, it is difficult—if at all possible—to predict a
priori the ways in which criminals will attempt to misuse computers and the
Internet. Rather than relying on definitional distinctions for concepts like
authorization and the scope of proper use, this Article suggests returning the
focus to the intent behind the actions. Intent requirements can be crafted
before legislatures know of the instances or even potential types of misuse
that the law seeks to deter and punish through criminal sanctions. This
Article proposes one such reform to the CFAA as a means of resolving the
tension between risk of overbroad prosecution and the need to afford
private property owners some protection against virtual trespassers.

